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THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: AN
EXPLANATION AND DEFENSE.
John D. Feerick*
In this article, Dean Feerick reviews the history of presidential succes-
sion before the Twenty-fifth Amendment's ratification, the debate and
discussion leading to the amendment's adoption, and current criti-
cisms of the amendment from the medical and political community. In
particular, Feerick addresses current suggestions for the creation of an
independent medical panel to determine presidential inability. He ar-
gues that such a panel would be contrary to both the principle of sep-
aration of powers and the philosophy of the Twenty-fifth Amendment
that those closest to the President, and those accountable to the pub-
lic, should be entrusted with the power to declare a President dis-
abled. In sum, Feerick rejects arguments in favor of an additional
constitutional amendment concerning presidential succession and
concludes that the Twenty-fifth Amendment, as implemented today,
remains the best possible scheme for the swift and efficient transition
of presidential and vice presidential authority.
The more we recognize the prospect of disability and understand the
objectives of the 25th Amendment, the better prepared the nation will
be for tragedy.'
Birch Bayh
INTRODUCTION
The absence of procedures for dealing with cases of presidential in-
ability and vice presidential vacancy had proven to be a great deficiency
in our constitutional system of government long before the ratification of
the Twenty-fifth Amendment on February 10, 1967. 2 Since its adoption,
the amendment has been implicated at least five different timess and has
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1. Birch Bayh, The White House Safety Net, N.Y. Tras, Apr. 8, 1995, at A23. For-
mer Senator Bayh was one of the principal drafters of the Twenty-fifth Amendment.
2. JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDLMNT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND AP-
PLICATIONS 237 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter FEmmcK, TWENTY-FIFTH].
3. Id. at xix. The Twenty-fifth Amendment itself provides as follows:
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President,
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proven its utility in providing for a quick and efficient transfer of presi-
dential and vice presidential power.4
Recently, however, the Twenty-fifth Amendment has come under at-
tack.5 Specifically, some members of the medical community have criti-
cized the amendment for not placing enough emphasis on the role of
doctors in determining presidential inability.6 Some suggest that Congress
has not given adequate consideration to the question of when the amend-
ment should be invoked,7 and propose the formation of a committee to
the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confir-
mation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written decla-
ration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and
until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers
and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the princi-
pal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may
by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the Pres-
ident is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice Presi-
dent shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declara-
tion that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the
executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide,
transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the Pres-
ident is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Con-
gress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose
if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the
latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one
days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of
both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting
President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his
office.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
4. FEmuoK, TwENTY-Fn-rH, supra note 2, at xxvi.
5. See generally Pamela Warrick, If the President Can't Lead Politics: Reagan, Wil-
son and Others Were Incapacitated In Office. A Physician/Author Says Steps Must Be
Taken To Protect The Country, LA TIMEs, May 27, 1992, at El (giving historical examples
of presidential inability and the shortcomings of the Twenty-fifth Amendment according to
Herbert L. Abrams); Henry B. Gonzales, The Relinquishment of Co-Equality by Congress,
29 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 331, 349-55 (1992) (detailing possible problems with the current presi-
dential succession scheme).
6. See, e.g., Tom Saladino, Presidential Inability Should Be Decided By Doctors,
Panel Says, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 29, 1995, at 4; John Calvin Batchelor, If Alzheimer's Struck
the Oval Office .. . What Do We Do When The President's Brain Fails?, NEwSDAY, Nov.
20, 1994, at 54.
7. Herbert L. Abrams, A Question of Succession: When Is A President Disabled?, SAN
DIGO UNION TRm., Jan. 6, 1995, at B7.
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determine medical guidelines." These proposals fail to take into account
the full scope of the amendment and the history which gave rise to each
of its provisions.
This article reviews the history of presidential succession prior to rat-
ification of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, as well as the debate and dis-
cussion which led to the amendment's adoption. The article also
examines current criticisms of the amendment and concludes that the
amendment provides the best possible scheme for the swift and efficient
transition of presidential and vice presidential power and that no further
constitutional change is necessary.
I. HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
A. The Constitutional Convention and the Law of 1792
The issue of presidential succession was first addressed at the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1787. The delegates in attendance struggled to re-
solve the question of who would have executive authority if, for some
reason, there were no President.9 The issue was referred to a Committee
of Eleven, which was commissioned to report on those parts of the Con-
stitution that had not yet been acted upon or had been postponed. 10 The
report of the committee was remarkable for its creation of an office of
Vice President and the election of both the President and Vice President
by an electoral college." The report stated that:
[I]n case of his [the President's] removal as aforesaid, death, ab-
sence, resignation or inability to discharge the powers or duties of his
office, the Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties until
another President be chosen, or until the inability of the President be
removed.12
Incorporating an initial proposal by Hugh Williamson of North Carolina,
Edmund Randolph of Virginia suggested that the committee's succession
provision be modified to read:
The legislature may declare by law what officer of the U.S.-shall
act as Vice President in case of the death, resignation, or disability of
the President and Vice President; and such officer shall act accordingly
until the time of electing a President shall arrive.3
8. Id. See also HERBERT L. ABRAMS, "THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SHOT": CONFUSION,
DISABILITY, AND THE 25TH AMENDMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION
OF RONALD REAGAN 246-48 (1992) (detailing the assassination attempt, the President's sur-
gery, confusion in the administration, and possible solutions to the problem of presidential
disability).
9. RUTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 4 (1968).
10. Id. at 5.
I1. Id.
12. JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS 45 (1965) [hereinafter FEERICK, FAILING
HANDS].
13. FEERiCK, TWENTY-FIFTH, supra note 2, at 36.
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James Madison objected that the italicized words would prevent the fill-
ing of a vacancy by means of a special election of the President and sug-
gested as an alternative the expression "until such disability be removed,
or a President shall be elected.' 1 4 At least one member of the Convention,
John Dickinson of Delaware, immediately recognized the difficulties in-
herent in Madison's wording. Dickinson remarked on the proposal: "What
is the extent of the term 'disability' and who is to be the judge of it?""'
His observations foreshadowed the difficulties that would later prove to
be so perplexing. Randolph's proposal, with Madison's amendment, was
accepted by a vote of six to four and became part of Article II, Section 6,
Clause 6 of the Constitution.
This succession provision, however, proved to be incomplete, and in
1792 Congress attempted to designate who, specifically, would act as
President whenever there were concurrent vacancies in the offices of Pres-
ident and Vice President.' 6 After much debate in both houses, Congress
passed a law providing for succession beyond the Vice President by the
President pro tempore of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, respectively.'7
The law of 1792 was in effect when President John Tyler ascended to
the presidency following the death of President William Henry Harrison
on April 4, 1841. Although Tyler's succession was not contested, protests
were echoed by some newspapers. Moreover, leaders of the opposition
Whig Party referred to him simply as the "Acting President."' 8 John
Quincy Adams, a former President of the United States and then a mem-
ber of the House of Representatives, had especially strong misgivings
about Tyler's succession. On April 16, 1841, he wrote in his diary:
I paid a visit this morning to Mr. Tyler, who styles himself Presi-
dent of the United States, and not Vice-President, acting as President,
which would be the correct style. But it is a construction in direct viola-
tion both of the grammar and context of the Constitution, which con-
fers upon the Vice-President, on the decease of the President, not the
office, but the powers and duties of the said office. 19
Adams and others felt that if the Vice President assumed the "office" of
the President rather than simply its powers and duties, the President
would not be able to resume power in cases of a temporary inability.20
Despite these objections, Tyler went on to finish Harrison's term. Thus, a
precedent for the Vice President assuming the office of President in the
event of a presidential vacancy became firmly established in our history.
The question of what would happen in the case of presidential inability,
however, was left unresolved.2 '
14. Id.
15. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 427 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
16. FEERICK, TwENry-FIrH, supra note 2, at 37.
17. Id. at 38-39.
18. Id. at 6.
19. 10 THE MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 463-64 (1877); FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH,
supra note 2, at 6-7.
20. 10 THE MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINcY ADAMS, supra note 19, at 463-64.
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B. The Law of 1886
Unlike the limited controversy surrounding Tyler's succession to the
presidency, major confusion arose when President James A. Garfield was
shot by an assassin on July 2, 1881. After the shooting, Garfield was con-
fined to bed for the last eighty days of his life. During that time, Garfield
received only a limited number of visitors. In fact, from July 2 through
July 20, 1881, only Garfield's family and physicians were permitted to see
him. Although occasional visits from members of the Cabinet were per-
mitted thereafter, at no point did Vice President Chester A. Arthur con-
fer with him. While the Cabinet tried to address the country's political
matters in Garfield's absence, many important obligations of the presi-
dency, such as the handling of foreign affairs, were neglected.22
Vice President Arthur succeeded to the presidency after Garfield's
death on the evening of September 19, 1881.23 His succession created a
new constitutional question concerning who would be next in the line of
succession if Arthur were unable to carry out the duties of the presi-
dency.24 The possibility that the country would be left without a presi-
dential successor triggered two principal topics of debate: First, after the
Vice President, who should be next in line to act as President? 5 Second,
what was the status of a Vice President who served as President in a case
of disability? 26 These questions led to considerable debate in Congress
and in scholarly journals on how to amend and ameliorate the 1792 suc-
cession law.
The November 1881 issue of the North American Review contained a
symposium on the issue of presidential inability, which included essays
by Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois,27 Governor Benjamin F. Butler of
Massachusetts, 28 Judge Thomas M. Cooley of the Michigan Supreme
Court,29 and Professor Theodore W. Dwight of Columbia College. 0 Judge
21. FnERicK, TWENwY-FwiTH, supra note 2, at 7.
22. Id. at 8-9.
23. Id. at 9.
24. Id. at 40 (noting that the constitutional question arose because at that time there
was neither a President pro tempore nor a Speaker to act as President if something hap-
pened to Arthur).
25. Id. at 41.
26. See, e.g., Lyman Trumbull, Presidential Inability, 133 N. AK. REv. 417, 418 (1881).
27. In identifying the problem of presidential succession, Trumbull wrote that "[tihe
Constitution has provided no tribunal to determine what shall constitute inability, or the
evidence of it, and it will be difficult for Congress to do so. It would be dangerous to vest the
power of thus superseding [sic] the President in a petit jury, or any judicial tribunal." Id. at
420.
28. Butler stated that "[n]o one could doubt in such a case [where the President is in
a paralyzed or catatonic state] though his official powers and duties were unexecuted by
him, that he would still be President until removed by impeachment because of his physical
condition." Benjamin F. Butler, Presidential Inability, 133 N. AM. REv. 428, 428 (1881).
29. Thomas M. Cooley, Presidential Inability, 133 N. Aht. REV. 422 (1881).
30. Theodore W. Dwight, Presidential Inability, 133 N. A. Rav. 436 (1881).
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Cooley succinctly summarized his position, and echoed the thoughts of
Trumbull and Butler, when he wrote that a case of presidential inability
would make the Vice President "acting President de facto."'3 Conversely,
Professor Dwight felt that "in case of the disability of the President, the
Vice President becomes President with all the functions of the office." 82
At the same time, debate on the issue of presidential succession be-
gan in Congress. Many members of Congress felt that the 1792 presiden-
tial succession law violated the principle of separation of powers, since
the President pro tempore and the Speaker, if called upon to act as Presi-
dent, would continue to occupy their congressional office. Consequently,
most critics favored a Cabinet line of succession, believing that there was
no doubt about a Cabinet member's status under the Constitution, and
that such a line would produce continuity of administration and policy."
On December 6, 1881, Vice President Arthur sent a message to Congress
in which he inquired:
If the [President's] inability proves to be temporary in its nature,
and during its continuance the Vice President lawfully exercises the
functions of the Executive, by what tenure does he hold office? Does he
continue as President for the remainder of the four years' term? Or
would the elected President, if his inability should cease in the interval,
be empowered to resume his office? And if, having such lawful author-
ity, he should exercise it, would the Vice President be thereupon em-
powered to resume his powers and duties as such?34
The necessity of finding clear and concise answers to these questions
spurred Congress into action. On January 19, 1886, Congress enacted a
new presidential succession law which replaced the President pro tempore
and the Speaker with a Cabinet line of succession, and inserted a provi-
sion providing that a successor became Acting President "until .. .a
President shall be elected."35 Although the 1886 law was criticized for
leaving "the question of the constitutionality and expediency of a special
election absolutely unsettled," it remained in force until 1947.30
C. The Wilson Inability
In late 1919, President Woodrow Wilson became ill during a speaking
tour of the United States.37 His illness was attributed variously to over-
31. Cooley, supra note 29, at 426.
32. Dwight, supra note 30, at 444.
33. Id.
34. John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential Inability- Will Congress Ever
Solve It?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 95 (1963) (quoting 8 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 65 (1898)).
35. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH, supra note 2, at 42.
36. FEERICK, FAILING HANDS, supra note 12, at 146 (quoting Charles S. Hamlin, The
Presidential Succession Act of 1886, 18 HAv. L. REV. 183, 191 (1905)).
37. See generally GENE SMITH, WHEN THE CHEERING STOPPED: THE LAST YEARS OF
WOODROW WMSON (1964) (discussing in detail President Woodrow Wilson's disability).
President Wilson's tour was intended to help him gain support for his League of Nations
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work, an apparent attack of influenza the previous April, and his trips to
Europe in December 1918 and in March 1919.38 On October 2, 1919, Wil-
son suffered a stroke which paralyzed the left side of his body. The sever-
ity of the illness prompted the President's close friend and physician, Dr.
Cary T. Grayson, to release a bulletin stating, "[t]he President is a very
sick man."39
During President Wilson's illness, facts about his inability not only
were kept from the media and the public, but also from Congress. Only a
few members of the President's Cabinet, including Secretary of State
Robert Lansing, were kept informed of the severity of his condition. The
result was that while President Wilson lay ill, strictly guarded by the
First Lady and Dr. Grayson, the country had no leader capable of execut-
ing the powers and duties of the office of President.40
President Wilson apparently failed to recognize the potentially dire
consequences of not having a capable Chief Executive. During Wilson's
illness, Secretary of State Lansing, in an effort to give direction to the
government, called several meetings of the Cabinet.41 Upon learning of
the Cabinet meetings and Lansing's suggestion that Vice President
Thomas R. Marshall assume the powers of the presidency, Wilson dis-
missed Lansing in February 1920.42
During the period following Lansing's dismissal, several inability pro-
posals were introduced in Congress. On February 18, 1920, Representa-
tives Simeon D. Fess of Ohio and John J. Rogers of Massachusetts
introduced proposals to empower the Supreme Court to declare a Presi-
dent disabled when authorized to do so by resolution of Congress.4" On
the following day, Representative Martin B. Madden of Illinois intro-
duced a bill which would authorize the Secretary of State to convene the
Cabinet to inquire into a President's ability to discharge his powers and
duties whenever the President had been unable to do so for six consecu-
tive weeks. 44 Despite the questions raised by the Wilson inability, interest
in the issue waned as he resumed his duties, and no action was ever taken
on these proposals.
D. The Law of 1947
The death of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on April 12, 1945,
and the succession of Vice President Harry S. Truman, once again
brought the issue of presidential succession to the forefront of American
political debate. In a special message to Congress, President Truman
declared:
initiative.
38. FEERICK, TwENTY-FIFTH, supra note 2, at 13.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DIsABm.ITY AND SUCCESSION 20
(1968).
42. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH, supra note 2, at 14.
43. FEERICK, FAILING HANDs, supra note 12, at 179.
44. Id.
19951
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
[B]y reason of the tragic death of the late President, it now lies
within my power to nominate the person who would be my immediate
successor in the event of my own death or inability to act.
I do not believe that in a democracy this power should rest with
the Chief Executive.
Insofar as possible, the office of the President should be filled by
an elective officer. There is no officer in our system of government, be-
sides the President and Vice President, who has been elected by all the
voters of the country.
The Speaker of the House of Representatives, who is elected in his
own district, is also elected to be the presiding officer of the House by a
vote of all the Representatives of all the people of the country. As a
result, I believe that the Speaker is the official in the Federal Govern-
ment, whose selection next to that of the President and Vice President,
can be most accurately said to stem from the people themselves. 4
Truman also recommended that whoever succeeded the Vice President
should serve as President only until a new President and Vice President
were chosen, either at the time of the next congressional election or by
means of a special election.48
The President's suggestions were introduced in Congress in a bill
sponsored by Representative Hatton W. Sumners of Texas in 1945, but
Congress failed to act upon the bill before the end of the term.47 Although
the 1946 congressional elections placed the opposition party in power in
Congress, Truman reiterated his call to change the succession law, and
Senator Kenneth S. Wherry of Nebraska reintroduced the President's
proposals.48 During debate on the bill, objections were once again raised
as to the constitutionality of having the Speaker assume the presidency in
light of the separation of powers doctrine. 49 This constitutional question,
however, was largely ignored, and the bill passed the House and Senate
and was signed by the President on July 18, 1947.50 The law changed the
line of succession so that in the event there was neither a President nor a
Vice President, the Speaker, upon his resignation from Congress, would
act as President followed by the President pro tempore and then by the
members of the Cabinet in the order of the creation of the various execu-
tive departments.5'
45. Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress on the Succession to the Presi-
dency, June 19, 1945, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 129
(1961); 91 CoNG. REc. 6272 (1945).
46. 91 CONG. REc. at 6272.
47. FERici, TWENTY-FIFTH, supra note 2, at 44-45.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1964), amended by 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1970); FEERicK, TWENTY-FIFTH,
supra note 2, at 44-45.
51. FERICK, TwENTY-FIFTH, supra note 2, at 44-45.
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II. THE ADOPTION OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT
On September 24, 1955, Vice President Richard Nixon was stunned
to learn that President Dwight Eisenhower had suffered a heart attack
instead of the "digestive upset" which the media had reported. 2 Never-
theless, Eisenhower, dissatisfied with the functioning of the succession
laws enacted up to that point, had taken precautions to avoid the inade-
quacy and secrecy of the procedures used by the Wilson administration."
Eisenhower had relied heavily on Nixon in the operation of his adminis-
tration and had made clear his views on the direction of the country and
the policies his administration advocated. It was no secret that Eisen-
hower preferred full disclosure and temperate but decisive action so that
the business of government could continue should he experience any
physical crisis. 54 As a result, for the length of Eisenhower's convalescence,
Nixon attended to the President's affairs, presiding over Cabinet meet-
ings and performing ceremonial duties. Nixon later described this unwrit-
ten agreement approach in handling a case of inability:
[The committee system] worked during the period of President Eisen-
hower's heart attack mainly because ... there was no serious interna-
tional crisis at that time. But had there been a serious international
crisis requiring Presidential decisions, then ... the committee system
might not have worked.55
Perhaps influenced by the drama of these events, later that month the
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Emanuel Celler of New
York, ordered the committee staff to undertake a study of presidential
inability.56
In an introduction to a House Committee Report on Presidential In-
ability, Representative Celler wrote:
In view of the precarious condition of present world affairs and the
tremendous responsibility which world leadership has placed in our
hands, it ill behooves us to tempt providence once more by inaction.
The time to strike at the heart of the problem is here. Clarification
must supplant procrastination. 7
To this end, Celler sent a letter to many of the country's foremost schol-
ars in history, political science, and law, requesting that they provide an-
swers to a prepared questionnaire. 5 The questionnaire asked the
following questions: (1) What was intended by the term "inability"?; (2)
Who should initiate and make the determination of inability?; (3) Are
there any constitutional prohibitions on initiating and determining inabil-
52. BAYH, supra note 41, at 23.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 23-24.
55. FEErIcK, TWENTY-FIFTH, supra note 2, at 20.
56. Id. at 52.
57. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 84TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON
PRESIDENTIAL INABILrrY 1 (Comm. Print 1956) [hereinafter 1956 Comm. Print].
58. Id. at 2-3.
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ity?; (4) Shall dual authority, both to initiate the question and determine
the question, be vested in the same body?; (5) Who raises the issue that a
disability has ceased to exist?; (6) Does the Vice President succeed to the
powers and duties of the office or to the office itself?; (7) In case of inabil-
ity, should a presidential election be held immediately?; and (8) Is a con-
stitutional amendment necessary? 9 The extremely varied responses 0 to
these questions spurred Chairman Celler to call for hearings on the sub-
ject in 1956. 1
When the hearings began, the Special Subcommittee to Study Presi-
dential Inability of the House Judiciary Committee heard testimony from
Senator Frederick Payne of Maine, Arthur Krock of the New York
Times, Professor Arthur Sutherland of Harvard Law School, and Profes-
sor Joseph E. Kallenbach of the University of Michigan. 2 These authori-
ties quickly identified the core issue: As Senator Payne asked during his
testimony, "[w]hat then does it really boil down to? In general terms it is
a question of determining presidential inability." ' Payne suggested that
Congress pass a bill that directed the Chief Justice, upon being informed
by the Vice President of a suspected inability, to appoint a panel of civil-
ian experts to evaluate the President." Arthur Krock, however, explicitly
rejected this suggestion, indicating that "[t]he objections to this are: (a)
The choice of Vice President to initiate a promotion for himself. (b) The
imposition on the Supreme Court of the kind of extra judicial function it
has always rejected." 5 This proposal was also opposed by Professor Kal-
lenbach, who stated:
There is first of all, a question of whether Congress can impose such a
responsibility upon the Chief Justice 66. . . Moreover, the panel of med-
59. Id. at 3.
60. For example, as to the question of who should determine presidential inability,
Professor Everett Brown of the University of Michigan suggested that the issue be left to
the Vice President, Cabinet, and presiding officers of the House and Senate. Professor Ste-
phen K. Bailey of Princeton University suggested that the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court be empowered to determine presidential inability. Professor Charles Fairman of
Harvard Law School suggested that Congress provide for an inability commission made up
of Justices of the Supreme Court and some members of Congress (perhaps the majority and
minority members of the judiciary committees). Id. at 4-20.
61. FFERICK, TwENTY-FIrH, supra note 2, at 52-53.
62. Presidential Inability: Hearings Before Special Subcomm. To Study Presidential
Inability of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) [hereinafter
1956 House Hearings].
63. Id. at 14 (statement of Senator Frederick Payne).
64. Id. at 16.
65. Id. at 61 (statement of Arthur Krock).
66. It is interesting to note that these positions on the role of the Supreme Court were
later confirmed by Chief Justice Earl Warren in a letter to Representative Kenneth Keating
of New York in which he stated:
It has been the belief of all of us that because of the separation of powers in our
Government, the nature of the judicial process, the possibility of controversy of
this character coming to the Court, and the danger of disqualification which
might result in lack of a quorum, it would be inadvisable for any member of the
Court to serve on such a Commission.
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ical experts would be entrusted with making a kind of decision which
would actually lie beyond their competence. They could be trusted, of
course, to discover the facts relative to the actual physical or mental
condition of the President; but a judgment on whether the condition
found to exist is one which prevents the President from discharging the
powers and duties of his office in the manner in which the public inter-
est requires goes beyond that. It involves a determination of the ques-
tion whether his physical or mental condition is such that the public
interest would be seriously affected if the exercise of presidential pow-
ers and duties were to remain in the President's hands. Furthermore,
there may be other conditions than physical ill health which give rise to
the question of presidential inability.6 7
Professor Sutherland adopted an entirely different approach. He be-
lieved that "the temporary or permanent displacement of one man by
another to perform the duties of the Presidency should take into account
the fact that the electors of the country have for the time being entrusted
the administration to candidates of a successful political party." ' Conse-
quently, he advocated a constitutional amendment that would create a
special body to determine presidential inability, consisting of the Chief
Justice, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the leaders of the Pres-
ident's party in the Senate and the House.69 Additionally, this body
would inform itself by medical and other expert opinion as the Chief Jus-
tice of the United States deemed necessary.70
Chairman Celler had also developed his own solution. He recom-
mended the establishment of procedures under which the President could
declare himself disabled, as could the Vice President, by announcement
to Congress.7 1 In effect, Celier preferred leaving the entire process to the
President and Vice President, with the President empowered to declare
the'end of any inability.7 2 In light of these conflicting views, it is not sur-
prising that the House Judiciary Committee failed to reach any agree-
ment and that, as a result, the efforts at reform came to a halt in the
House."3
Soon thereafter, however, new proposals for addressing the problem
emerged. Former President Truman advanced a proposal for a presiden-
tial inability commission in a New York Times article dated June 27,
1957.7 ' He suggested a seven-person committee to determine presidential
Presidential Inability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess 14 (1958) [hereinafter 1958 Senate
Hearings].
67. 1956 House Hearings, supra note 62, at 85.
68. Id. at 78.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. FEsuFcI, FAMING HANDs, supra note 12, at 240.
72. FEFaucK, TWENTY-FFTH, supra note 2, at 54.
73. Id.
74. Harry S. Truman, Truman Proposes a Panel On a President's Disability, N.Y.
Tnsns, June 27, 1956, at 1.
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inability, consisting of the Vice President, the Chief Justice of the United
States, the Speaker of the House, and the majority and minority leaders
of both the House of Representatives and the Senate.75 President Eisen-
hower, on the other hand, presented this solution to the public on March
3, 1958:
The President and the Vice President have agreed that the follow-
ing procedures are in accord with the purposes and provisions of Article
2, Section 1, of the Constitution, dealing with Presidential inability.
They believe that these procedures, which are intended to apply to
themselves only, are in no sense outside or contrary to the Constitution
but are consistent with its present provisions and implement its clear
intent.
(1) In the event of inability the President would-if possible-so
inform the Vice-President, and the Vice President would serve as Act-
ing President, exercising the powers and duties of the office until the
inability had ended.
(2) In the event of an inability which would prevent the President
from so communicating with the Vice President, the Vice President,
after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circum-
stances, would decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of
the Office and would serve as Acting President until the inability had
ended.
(3) The President, in either event, would determine when the in-
ability had ended and at that time would resume the full exercise of the
powers and duties of the Office.76
President Eisenhower's informal agreement with Vice President Nixon
represented the first significant attempt by a President and Vice Presi-
dent at meeting the inability problem.77
The next step taken toward a solution to the inability issue came in
early 1958 when hearings were commenced by the Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Amendments of the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by
Estes Kefauver.75 The Committee received testimony from a wide variety
of individuals, including Justice Michael A. Mussmanno of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, Charles Rhyne, then President of the American
75. Id.
76. FExmcK, TWENTY-FIFTH, supra note 2, at 55-56.
77. This agreement was later adopted by President John F. Kennedy and Vice Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson in August 1961, by President Lyndon B. Johnson and Speaker
John W. McCormack in December 1963, and by President Lyndon B. Johnson and Vice-
President Hubert H. Humphrey in January 1965. Nan Robertson, McCormack Asked to
Join in Key Meetings on Policy, N.Y. ThMEs, Dec. 4, 1963, at 1. President Johnson's last
agreement was originally an oral one, which was later put into writing. Transcript of John-
son's Assessment in TV Interview of Its First 100 Days in Office, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 16, 1964,
at 18. The oral nature of this agreement with Humphrey received some criticism. Charles
Mohr, Johnson Reaches Disability Accord, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 28, 1965, at 13. Arthur Krock,
The Johnson-Humphrey Agreement Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1965, at 28.
78. FxFRIcK, TW ENTY-FlFTH, supra note 2, at 54.
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Bar Association, Attorney General William P. Rogers, and Martin Taylor,
chairman of a New York State Bar Association committee 7 9
Once again, owing to the complexity of the question, the testimony
on proposed reform was varied. For example, Justice Mussmanno rejected
the formation of a commission representing the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government, as one proposal suggested, "because two-
thirds of the Commission would be made up of persons not elected by the
people and, to that extent, the plan would deny the people an authorita-
tive voice in the selection of their President.!8 Instead, Mussmanno be-
lieved that "[t]he only logical governmental body to decide Presidential
inability is Congress which is responsible directly to the people." 81
Charles Rhyne disagreed, stating that a constitutional amendment was
necessary, that the initial determination of presidential inability should
remain with the executive branch, and that Congress should have the ul-
timate power of review in the event of a dispute over restoration of the
President to his office.8 2 Perhaps the strongest advocate for the proposi-
tion that only the Cabinet should have the constitutional authority to de-
cide presidential inability was Attorney General Rogers, who testified as
follows:
It would appear to be a violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers for officials of the Congress to participate in any initial decision
of Presidential inability. Especially is it the case where under a pro-
posed plan more than a majority of the commission empowered to vote
would come from the legislative branch. In effect, it would enable con-
gressional leaders to put the President out of office, and to keep him
out, by declaring that he lacks the ability to perform his duties.8"
Rogers also felt that establishing complicated procedures and elaborate
legal machinery would slow down the succession process and would be
unnecessary except in the event of a dispute between the President and
Vice President.84 Consequently, he opposed any role involving the Su-
preme Court or an inability commission."
Despite the testimony advising against a role for members of Con-
gress and the Supreme Court in determining presidential inability, at the
conclusion of the 1958 hearings, the committee approved a resolution
similar to the proposal put forth by President Truman. Congress ad-
journed without acting on the proposal and, in the following year, it was
favorably reported by the subcommittee. Nevertheless, again neither the
parent committee nor the Senate took any action on the proposal. During
the period from 1956 to 1958, Congress heard testimony and received
written submissions from scores of authorities and entertained at least
79. 1958 Senate Hearings, supra note 66.
80. Id. at 71.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 195.
83. Id. at 165.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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twenty distinct proposals on presidential inability.80
At the outset of President John F. Kennedy's administration, Attor-
ney General Robert Kennedy was asked to analyze the question of presi-
dential inability. He responded to the President's inquiry in a
memorandum dated August 2, 1961,87 in which he emphasized that "there
is no question that the Vice President acts as President in the event of
the President's inability and acts in that capacity 'until the disability be
removed.' "88 Robert Kennedy went on to say that "there is no substan-
tial question that it is the Vice President who determines the President's
inability if the President is unable to do so." He concluded by endorsing
the agreement reached by President Eisenhower and Vice President
Nixon, declaring that he was "of the opinion that the understanding be-
tween the President and the Vice President which I have approved of
above is clearly constitutional and as close to spelling out a practical solu-
tion to the problem as is possible."8 0
With the endorsement of the Kennedy administration, the Eisen-
hower-Nixon approach may have remained the country's solution to the
problem of presidential inability. The assassination of President Ken-
nedy, however, produced a flurry of additional proposals dealing with the
subject. These proposals were influenced by the sense at that time that, if
Kennedy had lived, the country would have had to deal with the problem
of presidential inability in a most tragic setting. Senate Joint Resolution
139, introduced by the new chair of the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments, Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, quickly became the focus
of attention. 1 During hearings held in early 1964, the subcommittee re-
ceived testimony from forty-seven individuals, including Attorney Gen-
eral Herbert Brownell, Professor James MacGregor Burns of Williams
College, President Walter Craig of the American Bar Association, Profes-
sor Richard Neustadt of Columbia University, and Lewis F. Powell, the
86. These proposals ranged, for example, from those of President Truman, Hon. J.W.
Fulbright, and Senator Frederick Payne of Maine, calling for the Supreme Court's involve-
ment in the inability process, to that of Martin Taylor, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Presidential Inability of the New York State Bar, calling for Congress to create a small
tribunal to decide a question of presidential inability, and to that of Attorney General Her-
bert Brownell, stating a preference for leaving the entire determination process in the hands
of the executive branch. See, e.g., 1958 Senate Hearings, supra note 66, at 11 (letter of
President Truman); id. at 34 (statement of Senator Payne); id. at 38 (statement of Hon.
J.W. Fulbright); id. at 85 (statement of Martin Taylor); Presidential Inability: Hearing
Before the Special Subcom. on the Study of Presidential Inability of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1957) (statement of Herbert Brownell). See generally
1956 Comm. Print, supra note 57; 1956 House Hearings, supra note 62 (containing addi-
tional proposals).
87. See generally 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 69 (1961-1974) (providing an official statement on
the proper role of the Vice President during a period of presidential inability).
88. Id. at 94.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Realities of Presidential Suc-
cession: "The Emperor Has No Clones," 75 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1400 (1987).
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President-elect of the American Bar Association and a future Supreme
Court Justice.2 The subcommittee testimony included a discussion of
cases in which a President recognizes and is willing to declare his own
inability, as well as situations involving a vacancy in the office of Vice
President. 3 There was little serious controversy concerning how to treat
these events. The debate focused on who should determine a President's
inability when the President failed to do so.
A majority of the witnesses expressed their support for the position
advanced by a special task force assembled by the American Bar Associa-
tion, which recommended that an amendment be adopted to provide
that the inability of the President may be established by declaration in
writing of the President. In the event that the President does not make
known his inability, it may be established by action of the Vice Presi-
dent or person next in line of succession with concurrence of a majority
of the Cabinet or by action of such other body as the Congress may by
law provide . 4
Among the supporters of this view were General Brownell,9 5 Professor
Paul Freund of Harvard Law School, Ruth Silva, a noted scholar on pres-
92. Others who also testified include: former Attorney General Francis Biddle, Profes-
sor Paul Freund of Harvard Law School, Laurens Hamilton, Sydney Hyman, Professor
James Kirby of Vanderbilt University, former Vice President, and later, President Richard
Nixon, Professor Clinton Rossiter of Cornell University, Professor Ruth Silva of Pennsylva-
nia State University, and the author. Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of
Vice President: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 Senate
Hearings].
93. This testimony was relatively uncontroversial. For example, responding to a ques-
tion from Senator Bayh regarding the need to fill a vacancy in the office of the Vice Presi-
dent, Professor Burns testified:
I do not feel that this is a crucial problem. To a great extent, the Vice-
presidency in history has been an awkward institution, as you know, despite the
steps which we have taken in recent years. I think it would be dangerous to
develop this institution any further, both because it may clutter up the national
establishment, and also because it again would weaken the chances of a change
being adopted by the people.
Id. at 122.
94. Id. at 6, 204.
95. Interestingly, although Attorney General Brownell felt that he could secure a letter
from President Eisenhower in support of the ABA proposal, this turned out not to be the
case. Senator Bayh described receiving the letter in the following way:
On the problem of disability-of which he had the direct experience which
would give weight to his words-he had endorsed us one hundred per cent. That
would be powerful persuasion for reluctant legislators! I went on reading-and
my spirits plummeted ... [I]n the area most loaded with political controversy,
the occasion of possible disagreement between President and Vice President
over the former's ability to perform his task-Ike had suggested a commission to
solve the problem. Not only that, but the commission he proposed [comprised of
the three senior members of the Cabinet, the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, the leader of the minority party of the House, the President pro tem
of the Senate, the leader of the minority party in the senate, and four medical
personnel recognized by the American Medical Association] was made in a more
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idential succession, Richard Nixon, and Justice Powell. Although a num-
ber of other proposals were presented, including the formation of an
inability commission chosen by Congress,9" the continued use of the infor-
mal agreement between a President and Vice President,9 7 and the vesting
of greater power in the Vice President," a consensus gradually began to
take shape along the lines of the ABA approach. Consequently, the provi-
sions of Senate Joint Resolution 139 were changed to reflect the recom-
mendations of the ABA, and the proposal was passed by the Senate in
September 1964.19 The House, however, took no action because it was
anxious not to do anything that might be interpreted as an insult of its
well-liked Speaker, John McCormack, who was in the immediate line of
succession.100
After Congress reconvened in January 1965 and President Lyndon
Johnson reinforced the momentum for a solution by addressing the issue
of presidential inability in his state of the union message, 10 1 Senator Bayh
introduced as Senate Joint Resolution 1 the proposal that had passed the
Senate in September 1964.102 The Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments once again approved the proposal and sent it to the full
Judiciary Committee, which also gave its approval. 103 The resolution was
debated in the Senate beginning on February 19, 1965.10 Senator Everett
Dirksen of Illinois argued against the specificity contained in the inability
provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 1, suggesting that they be changed
to read "[t]he commencement and termination of any inability shall be
determined by such method as Congress may by law provide."'' 0 Senator
Bayh, however, explained the necessity for specificity as follows:
We are making a general policy determination... as to whether
we are going to open a Pandora's box to permit a blanket provision to
be given to Congress to provide laws in these vital areas at some later
date. There has been a general trend of thinking that if we have a
loosely drawn, nonspecific constitutional amendment, the legislative
bodies might be more inclined to accept it. [However, the] preponder-
ance of the evidence-I believe we received only three letters to the
contrary-was that State legislative bodies would prefer to enact the
ratification resolution, that State legislatures should deal with a specific
complicated way than any other that had been suggested to the committee!
BAYn, supra note 41, at 76.
96. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 115-16.
97. Id. at 214.
98. Id. at 181.
99. BAYH, supra note 41, at 50.
100. Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 91, at 1400.
101. President Johnson later followed up on the inability issue in a letter to Congress
in which he wrote: "I urge the Congress to approve them [Senate Resolution 1 and House
Resolution 1] forthwith for submission to ratification by the States." BAYH, supra note 41,
at 178.
102. In his book, Senator Bayh described this time with humor. Id. at 162.
103. FEERICK, TwENTY-FIFTH, supra note 2, at 84-95.
104. Id.
105. 111 CONG. REc. 3257 (1965).
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proposal and not give Congress a blank check to take away the safe-
guards to which the Senator from North Carolina has so adequately
directed our attention.1 0 6
Although Dirksen's proposed amendment failed, some suggested changes
were accepted and Senate Joint Resolution 1 was unanimously adopted
by a vote of seventy-two to zero.107
Concurrently, the full House Judiciary Committee, on February 9,
1965, commenced hearings on House Joint Resolution 1 (the companion
to Senate Joint Resolution 1) and the more than thirty proposals dealing
with presidential inability and vice presidential vacancy.108 The commit-
tee heard testimony once again from General Brownell and ABA Presi-
dent Powell, as well as from Senator Bayh and Representative Charles M.
Mathias, Jr. of Maryland.100 House Joint Resolution 1 was then approved
by the committee on March 24, 1965.110 The proposal, however, faced
criticism both in the House Rules Committee and, once approved, on the
floor of the House.' Once again the issues involving who should declare
a President disabled and the need for a constitutional amendment were
discussed. Changes were made in the proposed amendment regarding the
time period by which Congress would be required to act in the event of
disagreement over a declared inability. 1 2 Finally, House Joint Resolution
1 was passed in the House by a vote of 386 to 29.13
Since the House and Senate versions of the proposed amendment
differed, a conference committee was established to reconcile the differ-
ences. The committee's report passed the House with little debate by a
voice vote on June 30, 1965. In the Senate, however, several members
expressed reservations about the definition of inability and the individu-
als entrusted with the decision of presidential inability. They voiced con-
cerns about what might occur in a hostile situation where the Vice
President or members of the Cabinet attempted to use the inability pro-
visions to remove a President. 1 4 Nevertheless, their concerns were not
shared by a significant majority of the members, and the Senate approved
the conference report by a vote of sixty-eight to five. The proposed
amendment was then sent to the states for ratification. Within a short
time, the amendment was ratified by the necessary thirty-eight state leg-
islatures and formally proclaimed the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the
106. BAva, supra note 41, at 261.
107. FEERICK, TwENTY-FwrH, supra note 2, at 95.
108. Id.
109. Presidential Inability: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965); id. at 39 (statement of Senator Bayh); id. at 201 (statement of
Representative Mathias); id. at 223 (statement of Lewis Powell); id. at 238 (statement of
Herbert Brownell).
110. H.R. REP. No. 203, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
111. FEERIcK, TWENTY-FiFrH, supra note 2, at 99-104.
112. Id. at 103.
113. 111 CONG. REc. 7968-69 (1965).
114. See generally BAYH, supra note 41, at 305-14 (discussing Senate treatment of the
conference report).
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Constitution at a White House ceremony held on February 23, 1967.115
The Twenty-fifth Amendment confirms the practice of a Vice Presi-
dent assuming the office of the President in the event of the President's
death, resignation or removal. The amendment also establishes a proce-
dure for filling a vacancy in the office of the Vice President so as to re-
duce the possibility of resorting to the statutory line of succession. In
addition, the amendment allows a President to declare his own inability
and, where the President does not do so, provides a procedure for deter-
mining a case of inability, using the Vice President, members of the Cabi-
net, or other body as Congress may provide. Where there is a
disagreement between the President and the determining body regarding
inability, the amendment assigns Congress the ultimate role of resolving
it.
III. CURRENT DEBATE ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Twenty-fifth Amendment has come under a certain amount of
criticism because it has seldom been invoked since its ratification in 1967.
Nevertheless, the amendment has functioned well when it actually has
been used. For example, President Richard Nixon did not hesitate to ac-
cept the resignation of Vice President Spiro Agnew, knowing that a con-
stitutional measure was in place to provide for a new "untarnished" Vice
President. In fact, the smooth transition to Vice President led former
Representative Gerald Ford to state when he became Vice President:
Together we have made history here today. For the first time we
have carried out the command of the 25th Amendment. In exactly 8
weeks, we have demonstrated to the world that our great republic
stands solid, stands strong upon the bedrock of the Constitution.'1
Similarly, when President Nixon resigned under the pressure of imminent
impeachment by the House of Representatives, there was a swift and or-
derly transfer of presidential power to Vice President Ford, made possible
because of the Twenty-fifth Amendment.117 Finally, President Ford im-
plemented the provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment to fill the vice
presidential vacancy left by his ascension to the presidency. He nomi-
nated Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York, who was approved by
Congress as Vice President.
Despite the foregoing examples, some critics argue that the amend-
ment has not been implemented at all relevant times.11 For instance, Dr.
Daniel Ruge, President Reagan's personal physician, noted that in hind-
115. FEERICK, TwENTY-FnwrH, supra note 2, at 111.
116. 119 CONG. REC. 39,926 (1973).
117. Interestingly, the smoothness of the transfer was not accidental. Transition plan-
ning for a Ford presidency had begun secretly in May 1974. See FEERICK, TwENTY-FiFTH,
supra note 2, at 139.
118. For a discussion of the health of the Presidents, see generally JOHN R. BUMOAR-
NER, MI)., THE HEALTH OF THE PRESIDENTS: THE 41 UNrrED STATES PRESIDENTS THROUGH
1993 FROM A PHysiciAN's PoINT OF VIw (1994).
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sight the emergency provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment providing
for the temporary transfer of power should have been invoked following
the assassination attempt by John W. Hinkley in 1981.119 Others have
suggested that the much-publicized fight President Reagan is now losing
to Alzheimer's disease began while he was in office, thus preventing him
from adequately performing his duties. 120 Still other critics of the amend-
ment claim that the term "inability" is much too vague and unworkable,
and they question whether a Cabinet ever would be able to declare a
President disabled. 12 ' Not surprisingly, there have been calls for changes
in the amendment itself and, more recently, proposals for the establish-
ment of a medical panel to determine a President's inability.1 22
In responding to these suggestions and criticisms, it should be noted
that the idea of an independent panel of doctors to determine a Presi-
dent's inability was extensively considered and discussed during the hear-
ings which led to the adoption of the Twenty-fifth Amendment. In his
remarks to the Senate Subcommittee on Presidential Inability, for exam-
ple, Attorney General Rogers stated:
Some have suggested that the commission be empowered to employ
physicians and require the President to submit to physical and mental
examinations, and there have been different proposals for the commis-
sion and the vote of the commission and so forth. We think these plans
should be rejected for a number of reasons.
First, it seems unwise to establish elaborate legal machinery for
giving the President physical and mental examinations. This would give
a hostile commission power to harass the President constantly, and risk
danger of irresponsible demands for commission action. Not only would
provision for such physical and mental examinations be an affront to a
President's personal dignity but it would also degrade the presidential
office itself.
Second, it seems ill advised to establish complicated procedures
which would prevent immediate action in case of an emergency, be-
cause there is a need for continuity in the exercise of Executive power
and leadership-especially in time of crisis. Investigations, hearings,
findings, and votes of a commission could drag on for days or weeks and
result in a governmental crisis, during which no one would have a clear
right to exercise Presidential power.
Third, such a commission would be totally unnecessary except
where there was a dispute between the President and the Vice Presi-
dent in the executive branch itself.' 23
Moreover, virtually every proposal submitted for congressional considera-
tion expected that the body determining presidential inability would seek
119. Reagan Doctor Says 25th Amendment Should Have Been Used in '81, LA
Tms, Feb. 21, 1989, at 21.
120. See, e.g., Batchelor, supra note 6, at 54.
121. FEEwic, TwEsTY-FirrH, supra note 2, at xxii.
122. See, e.g., ABRAMs, supra note 8, at 249-63.
123. 1958 Senate Hearings, supra note 66, at 165.
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and obtain independent medical advice. 124 Thus, all relevant knowledge
and information would be incorporated into the process of determining
inability, while the final responsibility would be with officials who were
accountable to the public, either as elected officials or their appointees.
Although the drafters of the amendment were acutely aware of the idea
of an independent medical panel determining presidential inability, they
rejected the idea in favor of an advisory role for doctors. 12 5
The subject of a medical panel determining presidential inability was
carefully revisited in a 1988 conference held at The Miller Center of Pub-
lic Affairs of the University of Virginia.128 The conference, co-chaired by
former Attorney General Brownell and Senator Bayh, provided an oppor-
tunity to compile a body of excellent papers and statements on the sub-
ject of presidential inability.227 Many of those who spoke at the
conference expressed reservations concerning the formation of a panel of
physicians to determine presidential inability. For example, Dr. Kenneth
Crispell, Dean and Vice President for Health Affairs at the University of
Virginia Medical School, stated:
During the Twenty-fifth Amendment hearings in 1963 Truman
suggested the creation of a committee of seven to decide, constituted of
two members from the House, two from the Senate, two from Justice,
and one other person. They would decide about the President's ability,
but they would be in consultation with four medical leaders. I have
some objections. First of all, it is almost impossible to get seven people
to agree and four doctors to agree, so there is going to 'be a delay. I
think the question is really one of judgment and it is difficult for any-
one to decide about his [the President's] judgment.128
124. See, e.g., 1956 Comm. Print, supra note 57, at 4 (reply of Stephen K. Bailey,
Princeton University) (replying to Celler's questionnaire and proposing a panel to include
"at least 2 men of outstanding reputation in medicine and psychiatry"); id. at 5 (reply of
Everett S. Brown, University of Michigan) (proposing a panel to include "proper medical
experts"); 1958 Senate Hearings, supra note 66, at 37 (statement of Frederick G. Payne)
(proposing that the Chief Justice appoint a panel of qualified medical experts).
125. I echoed these sentiments in my remarks to the Senate Subcommittee on Consti-
tutional Amendments in 1964:
I would be very reluctant to see us set up a commission consisting of people who
were neither appointed nor elected, simply because they may have certain medi-
cal qualifications.
Inability is far more than a medical question. It is a question that one deter-
mines one way or the other, depending on the circumstances in the country at
the time, the need for a Vice-President to act as President, so that I don't know
that a medical commission is by any means the answer to the question.
1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 157 (statement of John D. Feerick).
126. See generally PAPERS ON PREsDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH
AMENDMENT BY SIX MEDIcAL, LEGAL AND POLITIcAL AuTHoRiTIEs (Kenneth W. Thompson
ed., 1988) [hereinafter PAPERS ON PRESmENTIAL DIsABUiTY I]; PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISA-
BiLITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT BY SIX MEDICAL, LEGAL AND POLIcAL AuToRI-
TIES, VOL. H (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1991) [hereinafter PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL
DISABILITY II](discussing alternatives for the determination of presidential inability).
127. PAPERS ON PRES1DENTIAL DIsABmIUTY II, supra note 126, at 60.
128. Id. at 61.
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Similarly, Chalmers M. Roberts, a former reporter for the Washington
Post and a draftsman of the Miller Commission (the Commission) report,
defended the mechanism set up by the Twenty-fifth Amendment and
suggested that the very flexibility now decried by those who would estab-
lish a permanent panel of physicians is what makes the amendment so
valuable. In his testimony, Roberts said:
The general consensus at the time [of the drafting of the Amend-
ment] was that the circumstances of the incident, when and if it hap-
pens, all dictate what the proper method will be to handle it.
Sometimes the medical problem and the political relationships of the
moment are such that the vice president and the Cabinet can do what
the Amendment allows them to do. Sometimes Congress is going to
have to intervene by setting up a special body. These are questions for
which there is a framework for an answer. I really don't think you can
ask for more than that.129
In light of this and other testimony,130 the Commission recommended
that Congress not create such a medical body, stating:
[T]he Commission has reviewed the various arguments and propos-
als made in the hearings leading up to the framing of the Amendment,
as well as current proposals, and has concluded not to recommend the
creation of some other statutory body. The Commission recognizes that
although the Cabinet ... may not be an ideal group, it is unlikely that
any other body could be designed that would be free of other difficul-
ties or receive as much political acceptance.131
The Commission did advance a number of useful suggestions on how
to implement the Twenty-fifth Amendment. In its report, it suggested
that written guidelines be developed by each administration for three dif-
ferent medical contingencies: an emergency, a planned procedure, and
treatment of chronic illness. 13 2 Additionally, the Commission recom-
mended an increased role for the White House physician, as well as con-
sultation with this physician during a President's term for his or her
input and knowledge of the President's health.133 These suggestions are
plainly desirable and will ensure the proper functioning of the Twenty-
fifth Amendment.
As for a more formal role for the White House physician, I expressed
elsewhere these thoughts:
129. Id.
130. The Commission also received testimony from former Attorney General Herbert
Brownell, former IRS Commissioner Mortimer Caplan, former Representative Caldwell But-
ler, former presidential physician Dr. T. Burton Smith, Dr. Leonard Emmerglick of the Uni-
versity of Miami, former Senator Birch Bayh, Professor Paul B. Stephan II of the
University of Virginia Law School, Dr. C. Knight Aldrich, and Professor James Childress of
the University of Virginia. Id.
131. PAPERS ON PREsmiDwriAL DIsABiry I, supra note 126, at 176.
132. Id. at 121-42.
133. Id.
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I do not think this is necessary or desirable. First, there must be
the highest level of confidence between the President and those who
serve him (or her) medically, a confidence which promotes a full ex-
change of information. Both the President and the nation benefit from
such an exchange. To introduce into that relationship formal reporting
obligations by medical personnel to third parties irrespective of presi-
dential wishes could prevent the development of the kind of bond that
should exist between a doctor and patient. This is not to say that there
might not be circumstances where conscience and ethics require action
by a doctor in the public interest without a patient's consent. For my
part, I would leave that to the circumstances of a particular moment
rather than requiring it as a matter of law. 3 4
There is also the danger that the White House physician will be unable to
give useful advice given the probability that his or her area of expertise
may not be applicable to the particular circumstances of a President's
medical condition. Moreover, there could be situations not involving
medicine, such as a kidnapping or other circumstances which prevented a
President from communicating with the White House, which would bring
the amendment into play.
With respect to other criticisms of the amendment, one would be
mistaken to attempt to define with specificity what constitutes an "inabil-
ity." No set of definitions could possibly deal with every contingency, and
the use of detailed language could create a situation where, during a time
of national trauma, unnecessary debate occurs over whether or not the
particular facts fit the definitions, or vice versa. The use of a general word
like "inability," a term given to us by the framers of the Constitution,
allows for flexibility and discretion, not unlike other expressions of our
great charter of government. The case simply has not been made that the
expression of "inability" is "unworkable."
Finally, scrapping the provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment
would take us back to the beginning of an eighty-year debate over a pro-
cedure for determining presidential inability. Moreover, if there were a
better system, the amendment itself gives Congress the ability to create
it. Section 4 of the amendment provides a flexible solution in dealing with
the unforeseen and unforeseeable. Congress can adapt the amendment to
the unique needs of each particular case of presidential inability. The leg-
islative history clearly indicates that Congress' Section 4 power to create
another body can be exercised even in the midst of a case of presidential
inability. Congress can designate the "other body" as itself, expand or
restrict the membership of the Cabinet, combine the Cabinet for purposes
of a determination with other officials, require a unanimous vote of the
body established by law, and prescribe the rules and procedures to be
followed by that body.13 5 This flexibility inherent in Section 4 is a neces-
sary component of the amendment, ensuring the most complete response
to the possibility of presidential inability.
134. Id. at xxiv.
135. Id. at 206.
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So, in the final analysis, the Twenty-fifth Amendment offers its own
solution if existing procedures do not work. Nevertheless, care should be
taken before the procedure involving the Cabinet is changed. The amend-
ment, of course, is not perfect. It does not deal with every possible contin-
gency, a fact understood by its framers, but the amendment has moved
the nation forward in an area that has perplexed it since 1787. Nothing in
the record to date indicates that there is a superior remedy for dealing
with the complex problems involved. The amendment treats the subjects
of presidential inability and vice presidential vacancy practically, in a
manner consistent with the important principle of separation of powers,
and in a way that protects the office of President and assures stability
and continuity in the event of succession. In considering any change to
the Twenty-fifth Amendment, attention must be given to the interrela-
tionships of its provisions. While the amendment weighs in favor of the
elected President, it stands ready to deal with a case of serious inability
in a workable and appropriate manner. One must proceed carefully in
changing the balances of the amendment. History provides examples of
new rules producing unexpected and undesirable results.
CONCLUSION
The Twenty-fifth Amendment is the product of extensive debate and
discussion, in which full account was taken of the history of presidential
succession and the many worthy suggestions offered for improvements in
the succession framework. The amendment provides an approach to pres-
idential succession which allows for an effective transfer of power in all
cases of presidential inability. In my view, the current suggestions for an
independent medical panel to determine presidential inability are ill-ad-
vised. The creation of such a panel is contrary to both the principle of
separation of powers and the philosophy of the amendment that those
closest to the President, and those accountable to the public, should be
entrusted with the power to declare a President disabled. As Everett
Dirksen, the minority leader of the Senate, said at the time the Twenty-
fifth Amendment was passed: "You've got to trust the system; you've got
to have faith that honorable men will act honorably in a real crisis like
this."13 6
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